Decision Tree Induct-Based Shill Bidding Detection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Combating Shill Bidding in Real Time: Prevention, Detection and Response
Human cheating has been a barrier to establishing trust among e-commerce users, throughout the last two decades. In particular, in online auctions, since all the transactions occur among anonymous users, trust is difficult to establish and maintain. Shill bidding happens when bidders bid exclusively to inflate (in forward auctions) or deflate (in reverse auctions) prices in online auctions. At ...
متن کاملAn Adaptive Shill Bidding Agent
This paper presents a software bidding agent that inserts fake bids on the seller’s behalf to inflate an auction’s price. This behaviour is referred to as shill bidding. Shill bidding is strictly prohibited by online auctioneers, as it defrauds unsuspecting buyers by forcing them to pay more for the item. The malicious bidding agent was constructed to aid in developing shill detection technique...
متن کاملShill Bidding in English Auctions
Shill bidding in English auction is the deliberate placing bids on the seller’s behalf to artificially drive up the price of his auctioned item. Shill bidding has been known to occur in auctions of high-value items like art and antiques where bidders’ valuations differ and the seller’s payoff from fraud is high. We prove that privatevalue English auctions with shill bidding can result in a high...
متن کاملShill bidding and optimal auctions.∗
A single object is for sale to N asymmetric buyers in the independent private values setting by means of an English auction. We consider implications of seller’s active participation in the bidding process, or shill bidding. The main result is that there exists an equilibrium of the English auction with shill bidding that is outcome equivalent to the optimal mechanism of Myerson (1981). Thus, a...
متن کاملSequential English Auctions with Shill Bidding
Shill bidding, where a seller masquerades as a buyer bidding for her own item to inflate the price, has challenged the classical auction theories. We show that with the possibility of shill bidding, a multi-round single-unit English auction has neither pure-nor mixed-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) when there is no gap between the seller's valuation and the lowest possible buyer valu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: DEStech Transactions on Engineering and Technology Research
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2475-885X
DOI: 10.12783/dtetr/sste2016/6588