Declining valuations in sequential auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Declining valuations in sequential auctions
We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential firstand second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Games Theory
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400186