Decreasing Returns, Patent Licensing, and Price-Reducing Taxes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Licensing and Patent Protection
We show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies...
متن کاملInvestment Taxes and Equity Returns
This paper investigates whether investors are compensated for the tax burden of equity securities. Effective tax rates on equity securities vary over time due to frequent tax reforms and cross-sectionally due to persistent differences in propensities to pay dividends. The paper finds an economically and statistically significant relationship between risk-adjusted stock returns and effective per...
متن کاملInnovation, Licensing, and Price vs
In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) can be completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover...
متن کاملMarkets in Intangibles: Patent Licensing
The absence of organized trading in intangibles has been a major hindrance to their recognition as assets in financial reports. Economic circumstances, however, change fast and markets in intangibles, particularly in patents and know-how, are operating both off and on-line (Internet). We examine the most active of these markets-the licensing of patents and know-how-which has grown exponentially...
متن کاملPATENT LICENSING AND THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY Richard
We construct a dynamic model of university research that allows us to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of US research universities. We assume a principal-agent framework in which the university administration is the principal and a faculty researcher is the agent. Whether or not the researche...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0022