Defeating pragmatic encroachment?

Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge

Philosophical discussions of knowledge typically examine what makes a true belief knowledge. Traditionally those discussions involve the notions of reliability, safety, evidence, or justification (among others), notions labelled ‘epistemic’ since they seem to matter to whether one knows. But many epistemologists now argue that traditionally non-epistemic factors can play a crucial role in wheth...

Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value

Does knowledge matter ? There are actually at least two questions behind this broad one. The first is whether the value of knowledge is independent from other epistemic values, such as the value of truth, or the value of having true beliefs. The second is whether knowledge, as an epistemic value is independent from other values, such as the good or freedom, which are practical or ethical values...

Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment

This paper offers a novel conversational implicature account of the pragmatic sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Developing an account I first suggested elsewhere (Locke, Inquiry 57:28–54, 2014b) and independently proposed by Lutz (in Synthese 191:1717–1740, 2014), this paper explores the idea that the relevant implicatures are generated by a constitutive relationship between believing a pr...

Pragmatic encroachment and epistemically responsible action

Decision theory, pragmatic encroachment, and Gettier cases

In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking or susceptible to count...