منابع مشابه
Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent’s choice ...
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This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal-agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent’s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentive...
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How does imperfect contractibility of preferences inuence the governance of a contractual relationship? We analyze a two-party decision-making problem where the optimal decision is unknown at the time of contracting. In consequence, instead of contracting on the decision directly, the parties need to design a contract that will induce good decision-making in the future. We examine how environm...
متن کاملStrategic union delegation and incentives for merger
A unionized duopoly model to analyse how unions affect the incentives for merger is considered. It is found that both firms will merge if and only if unions are weak. However, once surplus-maximizing unions have the option to delegate the wage bargaining to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members), both firms may have incentives to merge even if the union bargaining power is str...
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We analyze delegation of monetary policy to an independent but accountable Central Banker (CB) in a setting with a dynamic Phillips curve. The paper describes a mechanism that resolves the government's time inconsistency problem. Our proposal closely resembles real-world institutional arrangements and delivers credible implementation of the social optimum by giving dynamic incentives to the CB....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00033.x