Delegation of Regulation*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Delegation and the Regulation of Risk
Political principals typically use low-cost ‘‘fire-alarm’’ signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the...
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همطالعه حاضر به ارائه مدلی برای آموزش موثر زبان انگلیسی می پردازد. مدل حاضر از سه عامل تاثیر گذار در کارایی تدریس معلمان زبان انگلیسی بهره می برد. این سه عامل شامل سبکهای اسنادی، خود تنطیمی و فرسودگی شغلی معلمان ایرانی زبان انگلیسی می باشد. رساله مورد نظر درچهار فاز طراحی شده است: فاز اول شامل طراحی و رواسازی پرسشنامه سبکهای اسنادی معلمان زبان انگلیسی و فاز دوم شامل استفاده از این پرسشنا...
Aligned Delegation
A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent’s preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms – those which maximize the principal’s payoff against the worst agent preference type. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call “aligned delegation.” In an aligned delegation m...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Industrial Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-1821,1467-6451
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12238