Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Project Risk Assessment Framework
This study presents a framework for calculating the risk of various projects, especially projects under uncertain circumstances. First, the related literature is reviewed and then the relationship between risk and projects is examined. Using a case study an approach is provided to determine the project risk in uncertain circumstances where sufficient data is not available for decision-making. I...
متن کاملProject Risk Assessment Framework
This study presents a framework for calculating the risk of various projects, especially projects under uncertain circumstances. First, the related literature is reviewed and then the relationship between risk and projects is examined. Using a case study an approach is provided to determine the project risk in uncertain circumstances where sufficient data is not available for decision-making. I...
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Managing scope is a critical process in information technology (IT) project management. Reporting the status of scope requires both an understanding of the status of individual activities and the aggregation into an overall status for the project. Unlike cost and schedule which have the objective measures of currency spent or days passed, scope is subjective. Understanding the status of scope...
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Although it seems to be common knowledge that it’s impossible to succeed in a project with fixed time, quality and scope, we often continue to try anyway. This experience report discusses our successful failure at running fixed time and scope projects. I say successful failure because we actually failed to fix scope but arrived at an acceptable way to vary scope and deliver on time in an enviro...
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Political principals typically use low-cost ‘‘fire-alarm’’ signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/093245609789273268