Deliberating Collective Decisions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Deliberating Collective Decisions
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and match an array of stylized facts on committee decision making. Firs...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdx028