Dennett and Scientific Realism: Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Argument from Error
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Material Theory of Induction and Scientific Realism
John Norton has advanced a general view of induction—‘Material Theory of Induction’—that renders ampliative reasoning in a deep sense local. This paper is a sympathetic appraisal of this view, applying it to the scientific realism debate. It argues that the scientific realist should turn to such local construal of ampliative reasoning in her attempt to justify beliefs about unobservables. More ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Siberian Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2541-7517
DOI: 10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-3-49-60