Deposit insurance, remittances, and dollarization: Survey‐based evidence from a top remittance‐receiving country

Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines

Do remittances sent by overseas migrants serve as insurance for recipient households? In a study of how remittances from overseas respond to income shocks experienced by Philippine households, changes in income are found to lead to changes in remittances in the opposite direction, consistent with an insurance motivation. Roughly 60 percent of declines in household income are replaced by remitta...

Deposit Insurance: A Reconsideration

This paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced, and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls. We show that the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any FDIC losses. Deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied FDIC...

The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and Evidence

Public and Private Insurance Cross country evidence and a model

Insurance provision di¤ers across developed countries both in terms of total amounts expended, and of whether it is supplied via public schemes or private contractual arrangements. We propose a model where insurance is limited by the need to elicit unobservable e¤ort; entails implementation costs that may di¤er for public and private entities; and tends to be more desirable when liquidity const...

Deposit Insurance and Financial Development

We thank the World Bank for funding and Asli Demirguc-Kunt and participants at the World Bank conference on deposit insurance for their comments and suggestions. The views expressed are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.