Depreciation, adverse selection and housing markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Housing appreciation (depreciation) and ownersメ welfare
This paper extends Frank’s (2006) very simple model to analyze the welfare effects of appreciation and depreciation in a world with borrowing, property taxes, and moving costs. It is shown that appreciation can make homeowners worse off but that even when there is a property tax depreciation can not make homeowners who intend to stay in their house worse off. Our model provides a simple framewo...
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1 Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information can create adverse selection and undermine market efficiency. Economic and legal institutions, such as auditors, underwriters, accountants, or used-car dealers, often emerge to limit adverse selection and allow markets to function. As a result, direct government interventions are usually unnecessary. If a market does collapse, however—presumably...
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We study the Akerlofian adverse selection problem in a dynamic matching model where the competitive situation varies across different meetings. The 'lemons principle' is shown to limit the high quality sales within a wider range of quality distributions than in the Walrasian benchmark. High quality goods can nevertheless be traded, albeit less frequently than the low quality goods. For certain ...
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Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper the existence of adverse selection due to asymmetric information about quality is well-understood. Given the negative implications for trading and welfare, the question arises of how such markets come into existence. We consider a market in which firms make observable investment/entry decisions that generate products of a quality that becomes known only to t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Urban Economics
سال: 1978
ISSN: 0094-1190
DOI: 10.1016/0094-1190(78)90023-2