Designing user incentives for cybersecurity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Title: Designing User Incentives for Cybersecurity
Main Text: The traditional “patching” approach to managing software vulnerabilities and cybersecurity risk has been less effective than desired. In theory, once a vulnerability is discovered, software patches should be quickly developed and released by producers and then expeditiously applied by users. Successful completion of this process would help to maintain secure systems. However, what ha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Communications of the ACM
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0001-0782,1557-7317
DOI: 10.1145/2629487