Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored via stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are deterministic these two conditions coincide and by a rec...
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An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, admits a value. The proof relies on a representation of the game as a stochastic game with perfect information, in which Nature operates as a delegate for the players and performs the randomizations for them.
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We present a relatively general model of repeated games first, which will be later specialized for each different repeated game with different monitoring structure. Stage game is a standard strategic (normal) form game G = {N,A, g} , where N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, Ai is player i’s finite or compact action set ¡ A = Q i∈N Ai ¢ , and g : A→ <n is the payoff functions of n players...
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We consider infinite-state turn-based stochastic games of two players, and ^, who aim at maximizing and minimizing the expected total reward accumulated along a run, respectively. Since the total accumulated reward is unbounded, the determinacy of such games cannot be deduced directly from Martin’s determinacy result for Blackwell games. Nevertheless, we show that these games are determined bot...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.003