Determinants of earnings quality: The role of managerial ownership

نویسندگان

چکیده

This research analyzes and determines the effect of investment opportunity set, earnings persistence, capital structure on quality by making managerial ownership a moderating variable. is classified as type quantitative with panel data obtained from secondary financial report that has been published through Indonesian Stock Exchange website. Furthermore, sample was filtered using purposive sampling technique several predetermined criteria to obtain 30 manufacturing companies registered at ISSI for 2019-2021 met 3-year observation span. So, total used 90. Data analysis in this study Moderated Regression Analysis. After testing Eviews 9 tools, results show IOS variable positive significant quality, persistence negative but effect, while no quality. Managerial can only moderate IOS’ relationship however variables cannot be moderated influencing

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Akuntansi dan Teknologi Informasi

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1412-5994', '2614-8749']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24123/jati.v16i2.5721