Deterrence and Self-Defence
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Measures aimed at general deterrence are often thought to be problematic on the basis that they violate Kantian prohibition against sacrificing interests of some as a means securing greater good. But even if this looks like weak objection because can justified form societal self-defence, such measures may regarded for another reason: Harming in self-defence is only when it’s necessary, i.e., there no relatively harmless alternatives. While few ways remove threat posed by dangerous individuals, many methods preventing crime. We bracket off our preventative failings we think present threats, but cannot do so contemplating alternative measures.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Monist
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2153-3601', '0026-9662']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onab017