Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bribery in Rank-Order Tournaments
In many principal-agent relations, objective measures of the agents' performance are not available. In those cases, the principals have to rely on subjective performance measures for designing incentive schemes. Incentive schemes based on subjective performance measures open the possibilities for in uencing activities by the agents. This paper extends Lazear and Rosen's (1981) model of rank-ord...
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Economic analysis of rank-order tournaments has shown that intensi ied competition leads to declining performance. Empirical research demonstrates that individuals in tournament-type contests perform less well on average in the presence of larger number of competitors in total and superstars. Particularly in ield settings, studies often lack direct evidence about the underlying mechanisms, such...
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Many insights regarding rank-order tournaments rest upon contestants’ behavior in symmetric equilibria. As shown by Gill and Stone (2010), however, symmetric equilibria may not exist if contestants are expectation-based loss averse and have choice-acclimating expectations. We show that under choice-unacclimating—i.e., fixed— expectations both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria exist for all de...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Law & Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1555-5879
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1338