Different Matching in Public Goods Experiments with Punishment Opportunity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the "sucker" in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that...
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Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does...
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The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why collective action sometimes succeeds despite the prediction of received theory. But while individually imposed sanctions lead to higher contributions in public goods experiments, there is usually little or no net efficiency gain from them, because punishment is costly and at times m...
متن کاملEmotions and Punishment in Public Good Experiments
Experimental studies have shown that sanctions effectively deter free riding within groups. However, the over-use of costly punishment may actually harm overall welfare. A main reason for over-punishment is that free-riders generate negative emotions that likely favor excessive punishments. In this paper we ask whether the venting of one’s emotions in different ways can reduce the level of exce...
متن کاملThreat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments
Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost assoc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of European Studies
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1918-7181,1918-7173
DOI: 10.5539/res.v5n4p30