Differentially Private Condorcet Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy randomized based on well-known Condorcet method, focus three classes in family: Laplacian method (CMLAP), exponential (CMEXP), response (CMRR), where λ represents level noise. We prove that all our satisfy absolute monotonicity, lexi-participation, probabilistic Pareto efficiency, approximate criterion, SD-strategyproofness. addition, CMRR satisfies (non-approximate) while CMLAP CMEXP strong lexi-participation. Finally, regard privacy as axiom, discuss its relations to other axioms.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2159-5399', '2374-3468']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25714