Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Scoring rules and epistemic compromise
Formal models of epistemic compromise have several fundamental applications. Disagreeing agents may construct a compromise of their opinions to guide their collective action, to give a collective opinion to a third party, or to determine how they should update their individual credences. Recent literature on disagreement has focused on certain questions about epistemic compromise: when you find...
متن کاملEpistemic Utility Theory
Miners [34, 26]. You are standing in front of two mine shafts (A and B). Flood waters are approaching. You know that ten miners are in one of the shafts, but you don’t know which (e.g., their location was determined by the result of a fair coin toss). You have enough sand bags to block one of the shafts. If the miners are in A, then blocking A saves all 10 miners (and, hence, minimizes disutili...
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I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try ...
متن کاملEpistemic utility theory
One of the central projects of formal epistemology concerns the formulation and justification of epistemic norms. The project has three stages: First, the formal epistemologist produces a mathematical model of an agent’s epistemic states—call this the descriptive stage. Next, she formulates, in terms of this model, putative norms that she claims govern these states—call this the normative stage...
متن کاملEpistemic Utility in Commonsense Reasoning
Real world problem solving proceeds by the apparently non-systematic collection of relevant material and the determination of a satisficing solution (eg. Heath et al, 1995). Reasoning error has traditionally been interpreted as the discrepancy between such actual reasoning and classical probabilistic and logical derivations (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982). However, conclusions about sub-optim...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Philosophical Logic
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0022-3611,1573-0433
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-014-9318-6