Disclosure of Genetic Information Within Families
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Genetic lotteries within families.
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THE notes which follow are intended to form a convenient source of reference for clinicians and o.hers who encounter individuals and families with interesting variations and traits. As specific abnormal traits are usually uncommon and are seldom encountered, the individual clinician may have to spend much time searching for guidance on what information he should collect which may be relevant to...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: AJN, American Journal of Nursing
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0002-936X
DOI: 10.1097/01.naj.0000348607.31983.6e