Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f ( d ) as a function of distance is constant or strictly decreasing. show this game admits best-response potential. This result holds in particular for = w with 0 < ? 1. For case special attention will be given to the structure equilibrium set and conjecture about increasingness correspondences made.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ESAIM
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1270-900X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1051/proc/202171163