Discretionary Policy, Multiple Equilibria, and Monetary Instruments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria
In this paper, we characterize conditions under which interest rate feedback rules that set the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of the inflation rate induce aggregate instability by generating multiple equilibria. We show that these conditions depend not only on the monetaryfiscal regime (as emphasized in the fiscal theory of the price level) but also on the way in which money i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.845504