Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value
نویسندگان
چکیده
Central to this note is the concept of disjointly productive players. Two players are if there no synergy effect one these joins a coalition containing other. Our first new axiom states that payoff player does not change when another player, in relation leaves game. The second implies splits into two who together contribute same game as original change. These axioms, along with efficiency, characterize Shapley value.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.002