Distributional preferences and political behavior

Distributional Preferences and Political Behavior∗

We decompose distributional preferences into fair-mindedness (weight on oneself vs. others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs, and measure both at the individual level in a large and diverse sample of Americans. We find considerable heterogeneity in both the extent of fairmindedness and willingness to trade off equality and efficiency, much of which cannot be explained by standard socioeconomic...

Distributional Preferences and Political Behavior , with Ray

We document the relationship between distributional preferences and voting decisions in a large and diverse sample of Americans. Using a generalized dictator game, we generate individual-level measures of fair-mindedness (weight on oneself versus others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs. Subjects' equality-efficiency tradeoffs predict their political decisions: equality-focused subjects are mo...

Distributional preferences and competitive behavior☆

We study experimentally the relationship between distributional preferences and competitive behavior. We find that spiteful subjects react strongest to competitive pressure and win in a tournament significantly more often than efficiency-minded and inequality averse subjects. However, when given the choice between a tournament and a piece rate scheme, efficiency-minded subjects choose the tourn...

Political Choice, Public Policy, and Distributional Outcomes

The Distributional Preferences of Americans∗

This paper characterize the distributional preferences of a large and diverse sample of Americans. We decompose distributional preferences into two distinct components — fair-mindedness (tradeoffs between oneself and others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs — by estimating constant elasticity of substitution utility functions at the individual level. We find considerable heterogeneity in both ...