Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corre...
متن کاملPotentials and Weighted Values of Nonatomic Games
The “potential approach” to value theory for finite games was introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). Here this approach is extended to non-atomic games. On appropriate spaces of differentiable games there is a unique potential operator, that generates the Aumann and Shapley (1974) value. As a corollary we obtain the uniqueness of the Aumann-Shapley value on certain subspaces of games. Next, ...
متن کاملShapley values in random weighted voting games
Shapley values, also known as Shapley–Shubik indices, measure the power that agents have in a weighted voting game. Suppose that agent weights are chosen randomly according to some distribution. We show that the expected Shapley values for the smallest and largest agent are independent of the quota for a large range of quotas, and converge exponentially fast to an explicit value depending only ...
متن کاملre in Games with Externalities
In the presence of externalities across coalitions, Dutta et al. (2010) characterize their value by extending Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game consistency. In the present paper, we provide a characterization result for the core for games with externalities by extending one form of consistency studied by Moulin (1985), which is often refereed to as the complement-reduced game property. Moreover,...
متن کاملDistributing dividends in games with ordered players
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing dividends are the Shapley value (being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally am...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0