Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Divorce , Remarriage and Child Support ∗
Modern marriage markets display increasing turnover, with less marriage but more divorce and remarriage. As a consequence, a large number of children live in single parent and step parent households. There is substantial evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families. However, there is also some evidence that this gap declines with th...
متن کاملChild Support and Remarriage
This paper studies the reasons for low levels of child support paid by non-custodial divorced fathers. When mothers remarry, some financial burden of raising their children shifts from fathers to step-fathers. This provides an incentive for the father to encourage mother’s remarriage through the use of strategically picked payment level. Assuming father’s income is to some degree unobservable b...
متن کاملDivorce, Remarriage and the Housing Market
Subjects that the research investigated included the housing tenure of divorcing couples; the housing circumstances of the ex-spouses, including the number that lived as independent households and the effect on the number of separate households. Also studied were how many divorcees remained in owneroccupation and was there evidence about whether this involved moves to poorer and presumably chea...
متن کاملRemarriage after divorce and depression risk.
As marriage is associated with lower depression rates compared with being single in men, we aimed to examine if remarriage compared with remaining divorced is also associated with a reduced depression risk. Swedish register data were used to define a cohort of men who were born between 1952 and 1956 and underwent a compulsory military conscription assessment in adolescence. This study populatio...
متن کاملAn Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage
We develop a two-sided matching model with positive sorting. Match quality for each couple is revealed ex post and those with poor draws divorce. We show that full commitment and Nash bargaining mechanisms both yield the same non-contingent intra-household allocations. We then apply our framework to an analysis of changes in divorce settlement laws. Changes in laws governing property division i...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Labor Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0734-306X,1537-5307
DOI: 10.1086/508731