Do Managerial Ability Impact Indonesian Firm Risk-Taking Behavior?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Impact of Financial Characteristics on Future Corporate Risk-Taking Behavior
Organizational risk is often defined as a change in the flow of profit, or as a sys-tematic or non-systematic changes in the stock return flow. The risk taking of management is conceptualized as the actual investment decisions that are indictors due to uncertainty results. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of financial characteristics on future corporate risk taking behavio...
متن کاملManagerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation
I study managers' risk-taking behavior and how it is affected by equity-based compensation. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 5%. I also find that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives. In particular, firms with low CEO portfolio sensiti...
متن کاملManagerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...
متن کاملImpact of compensation structure and managerial incentives on bank risk taking
In this article, we analyze the impact of managerial compensation structure in publicly-traded banks on their risk taking behavior described by the loans extended by them, and the changes in risk taking through the changing regulatory environment for these banks. We build a simulation model to study the impact of the interaction between regulatory changes and competitiveness in the sector on ma...
متن کاملFund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking
We develop a framework in which we simultaneously model the interactions among investors, fund companies (represented by fund advisors), and managers. In this framework, we show that the interplay between a manager's incentives arising from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a non-monotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and prior performance rel...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: AKRUAL: Jurnal Akuntansi
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2502-6380,2085-9643
DOI: 10.26740/jaj.v12n1.p18-33