Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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Affiliations: Neuroscience Research Australia, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ. Paris 06, Paris, France. INSERM, UMR_S 1158, Neurophysiologie Respiratoire Expérimentale et Clinique, Paris, France. Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), Groupe Hospitalier Pitié-Salpêtrière Charles Foix, Service des Explorations Fonctionnelles de la Respir...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x