Does competition aggravate moral hazard? A Multi-Principal-Agent experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition and Moral Hazard
This paper investigates the equilibrium consequences of a contractual market with moral hazard where multiple principals compete each other to offer incentive contracts to agents who choose unobservable ex post actions. We show the following limit theorems: First, when the trade–off between incentive and risk sharing causes the moral hazard problem on the side of agents, the full insurance cont...
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in the securitization process, by selling the mortgage loans to risk-lover investors, originator can allocate the mortgage loans risk to them. in this case, originator may not have an incentive to screen out borrowers, resulting in the moral hazard problem. this paper, within a principal-agent framework, analyzes this agency problem. investor, to reduce asymmetric information, uses compensation...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Intermediation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1042-9573
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2017.09.001