Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?
This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager’s optimal policy, the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to infinity. However, the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking. Sometimes, the manager’s o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00288