Does ownership structure effect IPO underpricing: Evidence from Thai IPOs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Is the Offer Price in IPOs Informative? Underpricing, Ownership Structure, and Performance
When firms go public in an IPO, they must choose a number of shares to offer and a price level for those shares. Given an estimated total value, this division would seem to have little economic significance. Casual empiricism and the evidence from stock splits, however, suggest that firms do not choose their IPO share price level arbitrarily. We ask whether IPO prices are informative, in the se...
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We investigate the price performance of initial public o erings (IPOs) of formally state-owned companies in Australia. On average, privatised IPOs in Australia are underpriced by about 11%, which is not signi cantly di erent from the magnitude of underpricing of the privately-owned IPOs. This percentage is also similar to that of privatised share o erings in other OECD countries. In addition, c...
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In a typical IPO game with first-price auctions, we argue that risk-averse investors always underbid in equilibrium because of subjective interpretations of the firm’ communication about its actual value and resulting risk aversion about the likelihood of facing investors with higher valuations. We show that the noisier the investors’ inferences of the firm’ value (in the sense of first-order s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv3i2p11