Does signalling solve the lemons problem?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Economics Letters
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1350-4851,1466-4291
DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1066484