Does Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders Reduce Ingroup Cooperation?

Whistleblowing is a powerful and rather inexpensive instrument to contrast tax evasion. Despite the deterrent effects on evasion, whistleblowing can reduce trust undermine agents’ attitude cooperate with group members. Yet, no study has investigated potential spillover of ingroup cooperation. This paper reports results laboratory experiment in which subjects participate two consecutive phases unchanging groups: evasion game, followed by generalized gift exchange game. Two dimensions are manipulated our experiment: inclusion stage which, after observing others’ declared incomes, signal other members authority, provision information about content second phase before game played. Our show that effective both curbing improving precision auditing. Moreover, we detect statistically significant cooperation subsequent this result being unaffected experimental task phase. Finally, does not significantly alter subjects’ (tax whistleblowing) choices game: thus, knowledge perspective did towards whistleblowing.