Dominance Solvability in Random Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination strictly-dominated actions in random games. show that dominance solvability games is vanishingly small as number at least one player's grows. Furthermore, conditional on solvability, iterations required to converge Nash equilibrium grows rapidly action sets grow. Nonetheless, when are highly imbalanced, simplifies game substantially by ruling out a sizable fraction actions. Technically, we illustrate usefulness recent combinatorial methods for analysis general
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850992