Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation
Though some economic environments provide allocation rules that are implementable in dominant strategies (strategy-proof), a significant number of environments yield impossibility results. On the other hand, while there are quite general possibility results regarding implementation in Nash or Bayesian equilibrium, these equilibrium concepts make strong assumptions about the knowledge that playe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109616