Dominated strategies in searching for evolutionary stable strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies
A class of evolutionary selection dynamics is defined, and the defining property, convex monotonicity, is shown to be sufficient and essentially necessary for the elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies. More precisely: (1) all strictly dominated strategies are eliminated along all interior solutions in all convex monotonic dynamics, and (2) for all selection dynamics where the pure-s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of the Australian Mathematical Society. Series B. Applied Mathematics
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0334-2700,1839-4078
DOI: 10.1017/s0334270000006160