Double-Auction Mechanisms for Resource Trading Markets

We consider a double-auction mechanism, which was recently proposed in the context of rate allocation mobile data-offloading markets; our mechanism is also applicable to problem bandwidth network slicing markets. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic third party WiFi or femtocell networks (link-suppliers). Link-suppliers experience costs for additional capacity that they provide. Users and link-suppliers (collectively referred as agents) have pay-offs cost functions private knowledge. A network-manager decomposes into (with surrogate functions) agent problems (one per agent). The are modulated by agents' bids. Agents' payoffs then determined allocations prices set network-manager. Under this design, so long agents do not anticipate effect actions on (i.e., price-taking agents), competitive equilibrium exists solution problems, optimizes sum utility all agents. However, design fails when (including link-supplier) strategic (price-anticipating). Specifically, presence link-supplier drives system an undesirable with zero participation resulting efficiency loss 100%. This stark contrast earlier setting where users alone but - known be at most 34%. paper proposes following Stackelberg game modification asymmetric information structures order alleviate efficiency-loss problem: first announces payment functions; he invites announce its bid, invited respond games' losses can characterized terms link-supplier's function users' pay-off linear. quadratic, worst case 25%. Further, improves polynomial higher degree. For non-linear (e.g., α-fair log utilities), we demonstrate efficacy via. detailed numerical study.