Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages, and Litigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation
We consider a moral-hazard problem in a principal-agent relationship. Each party can renege on the signed contract since verification of effort is costly and subject to uncertainty. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties the pure threat of using the legal system may suffice to implement the first-best ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 2008
ISSN: 8756-6222,1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewn024