Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment

Epiphenomenalist dualists hold that certain physical states give rise to non-physical conscious experiences, but these experiences are themselves causally inefficacious. Among the most pressing challenges facing epiphenomenalists is so-called “paradox of phenomenal judgment”, which epiphenomenalism’s ability account for our knowledge own experiences. According this objection, we lack very thing take physicalists be unable explain. By developing an epiphenomenalist theory subjects and mental states, paper argues there nothing paradoxical or problematic about epiphenomenalist’s understanding judgments self-knowledge. The appearance paradox emerges from inconsistently combining (epiphenomenalist) dualism qualia with a physicalistic conception experience. lesson should not anything wrong epiphenomenalism, “dualists all way down”—embracing picture mind gives phenomenology central place, in its both their minds. Epiphenomenalist-friendly accounts reference memory also developed, showing neither issues creates epiphenomenalist.