Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probabil...

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power∗

Many assemblies grant one or more of their members the right to block decisions even when a proposal has secured the necessary majority—a veto right. In this paper, I analyze the consequences of veto power in an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous status quo policy. The division of the dollar among legislators is unchanged until the committee agrees on a new...

Veto players and terror

Democratic regimes have been linked to terrorism for contending reasons, with some scholars claiming democracy increases terrorism and others claiming it decreases terror. Corroborating evidence has been used for both relationships leading to the following puzzle: why do some democratic regimes seem to foster terrorism while others do not? We offer an explanation based on Tsbelis’s veto players...

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855—870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55—72, 1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and conflict is solved bilaterally between the rejector an...

Veto Players and Institutional Analysis