منابع مشابه
Dynamic Collective Choice: Social Optima
We consider a dynamic collective choice problem where a large number of players are cooperatively choosing between multiple destinations while being influenced by the behavior of the group. For example, in a robotic swarm exploring a new environment, a robot might have to choose between multiple sites to visit, but at the same time it should remain close to the group to achieve some coordinated...
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Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if a collective choice rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for a collective choice rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective...
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To be pertinent to democratic practice, collective choice functions need not apply to all possible constellations of individual preference, but only to those that are "humanly possible" in an appropriate sense. The present paper develops a theory of humanly possible preference within the context of the mathematical theory of learning. The theory of preference is then exploited in an attempt to ...
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When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate preferences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective schedule. We show how to extend fundamental tools from social choice theory—positional scoring rules, the Kemeny rule and the Condorcet principle—to collective scheduling. We study the computational complexity of fi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0018-9286,1558-2523,2334-3303
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2018.2797199