Dynamic communication with biased senders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Communication between multiple senders and a constrained receiver
I analyze informative equilibria between two senders and one receiver who share compatible interests. The receiver’s action is restricted since an action is costly. If the action is severely bound only in one dimension, information can be fully transmitted irrespective of the constraint degree. When the action is bound in both dimensions, full information revelation is still possible as long as...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.017