Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem
This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilinear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extracting the agent’s “new” private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the agent’s type stochastically evolves over time, and her payoff (which is linear in transfers) depends on the ent...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te2127