Dynamic coordination with individual learning
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic coordination with individual learning
We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives under which, in sufficiently long games, players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not do...
متن کاملEfficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning∗
We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with individual learning about payoffs affects the ability of agents to coordinate efficiently in global coordination games. Two players face the option to invest irreversibly in a project in one of many rounds. The project succeeds if some underlying state variable θ is positive and both players invest, possibly asynchro...
متن کاملIndividual learning of coordination knowledge
Social agents, both human and computational, inhabiting a world containing multiple active agents, need to coordinate their activities. This is because agents share resources, and without proper coordination or “rules of the road”, everybody will be interfering with the plans of others. As such, we need coordination schemes that allow agents to effectively achieve local goals without adversely ...
متن کاملDynamic Coordination and Learning
This paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a two-player strategic investment game. Each players learns about the quality of a new technology by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent, and has the option of irreversibly adopting it. I characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in the timing game in which there is second-mover advantage and ...
متن کاملDynamic Pricing, Procurement, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning
We consider a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product and sells it through a retailer facing a price-dependent demand. We assume that the secondperiod production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. As the mean and/or the standard deviation of the learning rate increase, the traditional double marginaliz...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.005