Dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the non-potential case

Abstract We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is natural assumption that the players’ actions cannot anticipate future values of their Such games go under name Cournot-Nash equilibria , and were first studied Acciaio et al. (SIAM J Control Optim 59:2273–2300, 2021), as time/information dependent version devised Blanchet Carlier ( Math Oper Res 41:125–145, 2016) for static situation, an extra potential type. The latter means can be reduced to resolution auxiliary variational problem. In present work we study generality, namely going beyond case. As result, derive existence uniqueness suitable assumptions. Second, convergence fixed-point iterations scheme quadratic Finally illustrate previously mentioned results toy model optimal liquidation with price impact, which non-potential kind.