Dynamic Duopoly with Best-Price Clauses
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic duopoly with best-price clauses
This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic device to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distinguished: "most favored customer" and "meet or release." I examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite-horizon d...
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We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also show that whenever an equilibrium does exist it is unique. Closed form expressions for the symmetric equilibrium prices and profits are provided. JEL Classification Numbers: C...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/2555861