DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH UNCORRELATED PRIVATE INFORMATION AND HISTORY-DEPENDENT OUTCOMES*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Japanese Economic Review
سال: 1996
ISSN: 1352-4739,1468-5876
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00052.x