Dynamic incentive effects of assignment mechanisms: Experimental evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms
Much of AI is concerned with the design of intelligent agents. A complementary challenge is to understand how to design “rules of encounter” (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) by which to promote simple, robust and beneficial interactions between multiple intelligent agents. This is a natural development, as AI is increasingly used for automated decision making in real-world settings. As we extend ...
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CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de lIndustrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research teams. The Scientific Series fulfils one of t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1058-6407,1530-9134
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12315