Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash flows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that distortions (aka, wedges) under optimal contracts may either increase or decrease over time. In particular, when the manager’s risk aversion and ability persistence are small, distortions decrease, on average, over time. For...
متن کاملDynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach Supplementary Material
This document contains proofs for Example 1, Propositions 6, and Proposition 7 of the manuscript "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach" omitted in the main text. It also contains a brief description of the numerical analysis reported in the main text at the end of Section 4. All numbered items in this document contain the prefix S. Any numbered reference without a prefix refe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004