منابع مشابه
Dynamic Monopolies of Constant Size
This paper deals with a polling game on a graph. Initially, each vertex is colored white or black. At each round, each vertex is colored by the color shared by the majority of vertices in its neighborhood. (All recolorings are done simultaneously). We say that a set W0 of vertices is a dynamic monopoly or dynamo if starting the game with the vertices ofW0 colored white, the entire system is whi...
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Consider the following coloring process in a simple directed graph G(V, E) with positive indegrees. Initially, a set S of vertices are white, whereas all the others are black. Thereafter, a black vertex is colored white whenever more than half of its in-neighbors are white. The coloring process ends when no additional vertices can be colored white. If all vertices end up white, we call S an irr...
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Properties of systems with majority voting rules have been exhaustingly studied. In this work we focus on the randomized case where the system is initialized by randomized initial set of seeds. Our main aim is to give an asymptotic estimate for sampling probability, such that the initial set of seeds is (is not) a dynamic monopoly almost surely. After presenting some trivial examples, we presen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0166-218X
DOI: 10.1016/s0166-218x(03)00261-0